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I. INTRODUCTION
The growing popularity and profitability of online gambling has
encountered a roadblock in the protectionist policies of many European Union
Member States.' In September 2006, Manfred Bodner and Norbert
Teufelberger, the chief executives of an Austrian gambling business, Bwin,
were arrested by French officials in Monaco for "organising illegal bets" and
"advertising online bets."2 An official in the French intelligence service told
reporters that "all bets, be it for sporting events or for casino games, were
illegal [in France], 'even if the website is outside of France.' "' This incident
perfectly encapsulates what is occurring across the European Union, as
countries prohibit access to foreign private or government-run online gambling
operations in an attempt to retain a monopoly that generates substantial
revenue for the government.4
This ban on gambling in general and online gambling specifically does not
mean gambling of all types cannot be enjoyed in European countries. In fact,
"gambling is aE75 billion business in Europe.. . ."' In France for example,
Francaise des Jeux and Pari Mutuel Urbain, which are both government
sponsored, are the only companies exempted from the French ban on online
gambling.6 State-owned or state-sponsored lotteries, betting companies, and
online gambling providers enjoy country-specific exemptions in many
countries across Europe.7
However, with the rise of the unbounded internet, nations are faced with the
prospect of attempting to protect their state-run source of revenue from private
companies attempting to procure citizens who once willingly wagered with the
state-run operations.' This is a tough task for these countries, as it is estimated
1 Gambling in Europe: Stacking the Deck, ECONOMIST, Aug. 17, 2006 [hereinafter
Gambling in Europe] (discussing European countries' response and regulation of gambling
websites), available athttp://www.economist.com/business/displaystory.cfim?storyid=7808754.




4 See Gambling in Europe, supra note 1.
5 James Rutherford, Cyber-Fortress Europe: Italy's Ban on Foreign Operators Opens a
New Front in Europe's Battle for a 'Common Market' for Gambling, INT'L GAMING &
WAGERING Bus., Mar. 2006, available at http://www.igwb.com/article.php?ida=65 1.
6 Wallop, supra note 2.




that there are 2,000 online gambling sites with an estimated twenty-three
million people9 wagering nearly $12 billion in 2005 alone.'0 A more recent
study conducted by England's government in preparation for the world's first
online gambling summit revealed: Britain has almost one million regular
online gamblers, Europe has roughly 3.3 million regular online gamblers, and
2,300 online gambling sites exist across the world."
Many European nations with state monopolies on gambling are members
of the European Union (EU), 12 an intergovernmental organization that unites
twenty-seven Member States. 3 One of the internal policies of the EU is the
free trade of goods and services among Member States. 4 In 1994, the
European Court of Justice in Her Majesty's Customs and Excise v. Schindler
established that gambling is a legitimate "service" under the meaning of the
Treaty of Rome.' 5 However, as previously mentioned, many of the EU
Member States have their own state-run gambling monopolies, which appear
to prohibit the free flow of services, by prohibiting non-state sponsored
gambling or promotion of non-state sponsored gambling within their state.' 6
According to Commissioner Charlie McCreevy of the European Commission,
9 American Gaming Ass'n, Fact Sheets, Internet Gambling, http://www.americangaming.
org/Industry/factsheets/issues detail.cfv?id=17 (last visited Mar. 24, 2008).
10 Frank J. Fahrenkopf, President & CEO American Gaming Ass'n, Address to the Asian
Gaming Expo: To Asia and Beyond: The Next Generation of Global Gaming at the Asian
Gaming Expo (June 14, 2006) (transcript available at http://www.americangaming.org/Press/
speeches/sp eechesdetail.cfv?ID=398).
" Press Release, Dep't for Culture, Media & Sport, Extent of Online Gambling Revealed
Ahead of International Summit (Oct. 31, 2006) [hereinafter Extent of Online Gambling],
available at http://www.culture.gov.uk/Referencelibrary/press-notices/archive_2006/DCMS
134 06.htm.
12 Europa, Key Facts and Figures about Europe and the Europeans, http://europa.eu/abc/key
figures/index en.htm (last visited Mar. 24, 2008).
13 See id.
" A DICTIONARY OF THE EUROPEAN UNION 210 (David Phinnemore & Lee McGowan
eds., 1st ed. 2002) ("Freedom of movement lies at the heart of the objectives outlined in the
Treaty of Rome, which required the abolition of barriers to the 'freedom of movement for
persons, services, and capital.' ").
" Case C-275/92, Her Majesty's Customs and Excise v. Schindler, 1994 E.C.R. 1-1039;
Rutherford, supra note 5.
16 Philippe Vlaemminck & Pieter De Wael, The European Union Regulatory Approach of
Online Gambling and Its Impact on the Global Gaming Industry, 7 GAMING L. REv. 177, 177
(2003) ("All EU Member States, except the United Kingdom and some offshore jurisdictions,
have imposed strict limitations on cross-border gambling activities in order to control and limit
the supply of gambling in their territory and to ensure that the revenue of gambling is to a certain
extent used for public benefit.").
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"the Commission is building cases against eight countries in addition to the
seven countries which were warned in the spring [of 2006]" about the state
monopolies on gambling."
The countries under investigation by the Commission argue there is no
specific EU legislation prohibiting them from outlawing non-state sponsored
gambling in the country.'" They also point to cases where the European Court
of Justice (ECJ) has held that national restrictions can be justified by public
interest objectives. 9 However, according to the jurisprudence of the ECJ,
national restrictions must not go beyond what is necessary to attain these
public interest aims.2° How can Member States point to the harms of gambling
on the public interest when they in fact have their own state run gambling
monopolies? Also, how can the EU leave it to national courts to decide if their
own protective national legislation is in line with EU policy?
It is time for the EU to go beyond the jurisprudence of the ECJ and attempt
a harmonizing EU law by allowing country-sponsored and private company
online gambling in each of its Member States. While discussing the matter of
gambling and gaming services in 1992, the EU itself recognized " 'that as the
Community becomes ever more closely integrated, and technological
developments open up markets worldwide, it [cannot] be precluded that the
Commission will have to reconsider its position [on gambling] in view of new
and as yet unforeseeable trends.' "21 Certainly, the rise of the unbounded
internet was an unforeseeable trend that opened up markets across the globe,
and it is now time for the EU to deal with this issue. The harmonization of
online gaming across the EU would establish a framework for the national
"7 Jorgen Andresen, The Danish Pools and Lottery Monopoly under EU Pressure, BORSEN
(Den.), Sept. 13, 2006 [hereinafter The Danish Pools], available at http://borsen.dk/nyhed/94
994. See also Gambling in Europe, supra note I (observing that in April of 2006 "the
commission sent warning letters to seven EU countries asking them to justify state monopolies
that do not seem to be acting in the public interest. The Swedish monopoly, for instance,
recently launched its own online poker game: an astute commercial move, to be sure, but hardly
the most obvious way to curb gambling addiction."). The potential countries under investigation
were: Denmark, Germany, Italy, Holland, Sweden, Hungary, and Finland. The Danish Pools,
supra.
"B Gambling in Europe, supra note 1 (indicating gambling was not initially included in the
EU services directive and was therefore not considered a service capable of protection under EU
legislation/treaty).
"9 Case C-243/01, Criminal Proceedings Against Gambelli, 2003 E.C.R. I-13031.
20 Id.
2 Thibault Verbiest & Ewout Keuleers, Cross Border Gaming: The European Regulatory
Perspective, 7 GAMING L. REv. 185, 185 (2003).
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governments to work within, as well as protect consumers, which many states
argue is their primary goal in restricting cross-border gaming.
Part II of this Note provides the EU definition and treatment of "services,"
the jurisprudence of the ECJ in regards to gambling and services, and a brief
introduction to harmonization as it applies to the EU. Part III begins with the
argument that Member States are breaking EU policy by not allowing
gambling "services" within their country, and further argues harmonization is
not only possible, but needed across the EU. Part IV concludes the Note by
analyzing the implications of what harmonization will bring to the EU in future
years.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Establishment of the European Union and Free Movement of Services
The Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community (EEC Treaty),
also known as the Rome Treaty, was the first step towards today's EU when
it was signed on March 25, 1957.22 The goal of the treaty was to eventually
create a single European market for goods.23 Therefore, one of the basic
principles of the treaty was the "free movement of services" across borders and
among member states. 24 Article 49 of the EEC Treaty specifically provides:
"[R]estrictions on freedom to provide services within the Community shall be
prohibited in respect of nationals of Member States who are established in a
State of the Community other than that of the person for whom the services are
intended.
25
Article 50 of the Treaty characterizes "services" as having a commercial or
industrial character.26 However, in the early 1990s, the European Community
was unclear on whether gambling should be necessarily characterized as a
service. 27 Therefore, the European Commission conducted a "1991 study
entitled 'Gambling in the single market-A study of the current legal and
market situation.' ,28 Based on this study, "the European Council decided [in
22 Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957,298 U.N.T.S. 11
[hereinafter EEC Treaty].
23 Id.
24 Verbiest & Keuleers, supra note 21.
25 EEC Treaty, supra note 22, art. 49.
26 Id. art. 50.
27 Vlaemminck & De Wael, supra note 16, at 177.
28 Id.
2008]
GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
December of 1992] 'not to regulate gambling at the EU level, as it found that
gambling is better dealt with at the national level.' ,29 This concept is known
as subsidiarity:
action should only be taken at Community level if this is
justified: the Union should not treat an issue (except in the areas
which fall within its exclusive competence) unless it is more
effective at treating this problem than the national, regional or
local level. The basic principles underlying subsidiarity were
laid down in the Edinburgh European Council (December 1992)
which enshrines subsidiarity in the EU Treaty. The Treaty of
Amsterdam followed by adopting a Protocol on the application
of subsidiarity.3 °
Therefore, gambling is regulated within the EU at the national level, which
has led many EU Member States to institute limitations or restrictions on
cross-border gambling among EU Member States in an attempt to generate
income for themselves.3
B. EU Common Law Decisions on "Services"
Beginning with the case of Her Majesty's Customs and Excise v. Schindler
and more recently with Criminal Proceedings Against Gambelli, the European
Court of Justice has modified the definition of services to include gambling
and more specifically online gambling.
In Schindler, a German company wanted to compete with the British
national lottery and was sending advertisements and application forms to
British citizens.32 The ECJ "ruled that the activities at issue were those which
provided for remuneration by an operator to enable persons to participate in a
game of chance with the hope of winning. For that reason and by virtue of
Article 50 of the EEC Treaty, they had to be considered as services."33
29 Id.
30 Euractiv.com, EU Treaty & Institutions, Glossary: subsidiarity, http://www.euractiv.com/
en/constitution/glossary/article- 117273 (last visited Mar. 16, 2008).
" Vlaemminck & De Wael, supra note 16, at 177. For example, some countries within the
EU, like Finland and Sweden, have restrictions on gambling that allow only state-controlled
companies to operate or even offer any type of gambling service within its borders. Id.
32 Verbiest & Keuleers, supra note 21, at 188.
'3 Id. This was an important decision as gambling, specifically state lotteries, had not been
[Vol. 36:413
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Besides recognizing gambling, specifically state-sponsored lotteries, as a
service, the ECJ broadly laid out the rationale behind the prohibition and state
exceptions to gambling:
The reasons for the prohibitions are broadly the same. Lotteries
and games of chance are activities which, for ethical and social
reasons, should not be permitted. Citizens should be protected
against the dangers that may stem from the urge to gamble and
there is a significant risk of criminality in this field.
But at the same time in all Member States there are to a
greater or lesser extent exceptions from that prohibition. That is
because it may be appropriate to permit some measure of
gambling, partly to meet the citizens' desire to gamble and partly
to prevent unlawful gambling. It is possible to lay down
requirements concerning permitted forms of gambling in such a
way as to limit the risk of criminality. In addition a significant
factor in all the Member States is that it is possible to make
authorization subject to conditions whereby the revenue from
gambling is used for public-interest purposes or accrues to the
State exchequer.34
However, the court in Schindler also recognized that the United Kingdom (and
by extension other Member States) could restrict or even prohibit lotteries
from other EU Member States, provided restrictions were not discriminatory
on the basis of nationality.3" The court declared that restrictions based on
public interest concerns would not be seen by the court as measures interfering
with the freedom to provide services among Member States.3 6
Expanding on Schindler, the ECJ, in Questore di Verona v. Zenatti, ruled
sports betting was a service that could be restricted by Member States.37 As
classified as a "service" under the initial EEC Treaty Services Directive. Id.
" Case C-275/92, Her Majesty's Customs and Excise v. Schindler, 1994 E.C.R. 1-1039,
1 1-2.
" Id. 64. See also EEC Treaty, supra note 22, art. 49.
36 Schindler, 1994 E.C.R. 1-1039, 34-35 ("[T]he activity must be carried out in order to
ensure that it is not abused to the detriment of the individual players and of society as a whole.").
3 Case C-67/98, Questore di Verona v. Diego Zenatti, 1999 E.C.R. 1-7289, 30.
National authorities have, in this regard, particular latitude to determine what
steps to take, in the light of specific social and cultural features, especially the
widely differing moral and social attitudes to gambling in the Member States.
2008)
GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
a whole, the Schindler and Zenatti cases stand for the proposition that
"member states have a discretional competence to impede the cross-border
provision of gaming services throughout the European internal market,
provided that the imposed restrictions are: i) not discriminatory; ii)justified by
imperative reasons of general interest; and iii) proportional and necessary to
achieve the objectives pursued."38
The ECJ received its first gambling case when Piergiorgio Gambelli, was
arrested in Italy for transmitting sports wagers online. 9  The Italian
government alleged Gambelli's actions were illegal under local law.4"
Gambelli responded by asserting that the Italian law was contrary to the
rationale behind the EEC Treaty in that it violated the freedom of
establishment and freedom to provide services.4"
The opinion of the Advocate General, Siegbert Alber, stated Italy's law was
purely discriminatory against bookmakers from other countries, but the court
did not follow Alber. Instead it decided to apply the rationale from Schindler
and Zanetti by saying that "public interest considerations may justify
limitations on free movement of services, providing the objectives to be
achieved are not disproportionate to the restrictions imposed."42 The court
determined that:
national legislation which prohibits on pain of criminal penalties the
pursuit of the activities of collecting, taking, booking and
forwarding offers of bets, in particular bets on sporting events,
without a license or authorization from the Member State
Thus, the fact that certain forms of gambling are permitted, subject to
necessary controls, while others, which differ in their objects, rules and
methods of organisation, are prohibited, may be the acceptable consequence
of national choices of a socio-cultural character.
Id.
3 Thibault Verbiest & Ewout Keuleers, Gambelli Case Makes It Harder for Nations to
Restrict Gaming, 8 GAMING L. REv. 9, 10 (2004).
" Case C-243/01, Criminal Proceedings Against Gambelli, 2003 E.C.R. 1-13031. Gambelli
was an Italian agent for Stanleybet International, a UK based gambling company. Id.
40 Id.
41 Id.




concerned constitutes a restriction on the freedom of
establishment and the freedom to provide services provided for
in Articles 43 and 49 EC respectively. 43
However, even after determining this violation of Articles 43 and 49, the
ECJ held it was for the national court to determine if its national laws were
disproportionate under the Schindler analysis and the recognized EU principle
of subsidiarity." On remand, the Italian national court determined the law did
not violate EU measures as its restrictions had a public order interest, keeping
gambling free from criminality, that did not make the law disproportionate.45
Shortly after the decision, Italy passed laws requiring "telecommunications and
Internet service providers to block content from operators not licensed in the
country, effectively barring more than 600 Web sites from taking bets in Italy's
16500 million online market. '46 This ruling made Italy the first nation of the
EU to determine its national laws did not violate EU policy.47
However, this legislation has prompted investigation by the European
Commission as a result of "complaints from a number of sporting bookmakers
of national protectionism in [countries'] online gambling regimes."'' 8 For, as
a result of a February 2006 vote by the European Parliament on a new directive
4' Gambelli, 2003 E.C.R. 1-1303 1, 76.
4 Id. ("It is for the national court to determine whether such legislation, taking account of
the detailed rules for its application, actually serves the aims which might justify it, and whether
the restrictions it imposes are disproportionate in the light of those aims." (emphasis added)).
45 O'Connor, supra note 42.
46 Rutherford, supra note 5.
47 Id.
The Dutch Supreme Court made a similar finding last year in a challenge
brought by Ladbrokes [which is one of the world's leading sports betting and
gaming companies. See Ladbrokes PLC, About Us, http://www.ladbrokesp
Ic.com/AboutUs/ (last visited Mar. 24, 2008).] A regional court in Germany
has likewise found against BetandWin. In France, which in a fit of"economic
patriotism" last year set barriers to foreign acquisitions in gambling and a host
of other "sensitive" industries, the Court of Appeal in Paris has upheld a ban
against an online operator out of Malta, Zeturf, which had been taking race
bets in competition with the government monopoly Pari Mutuel Urbain.
Id.
4 Anne Jolis, EU May Add 8 Countries to Gambling Protectionism Probe,
DOWJONESBUS.NEWS, Sept. 12, 2006 (stating "the investigation targets state-owned or protected
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on the free movement of services, gambling is now specifically excluded as a
service.49
C. Harmonization Introduction
Harmonization is one way the EU attempts to bring Member State policies,
laws, and standards in line with EU policies, especially the internal market
program.5" Beginning in 1957, the European Community sought to attain a
single, common market for European "goods, persons, services, and capital,"
and therefore "[h]armonization was envisaged by the Treaty of Rome, which
gave wide-ranging powers to the Community to enact secondary legislation"
to accomplish this goal." This power to harmonize was given to the EU
through the addition of Article 95 to the Treaty of Rome by the Single
European Act 1986.52 Article 95 provides "for the approximation of laws
within the European Communities and [is] therefore of fundamental
importance to the existence of the internal market."53 Specifically, the text of
the Act provides "for the approximation of the provisions laid down by law,
regulation, or administrative action in Member States which have as their
object the establishment and functioning of the internal market."54
" Council Directive 2006/123, 2006 O.J. (L376) 1, 4. "Gambling activities, including
lottery and betting transactions, should be excluded from scope of this Directive in view of the
specific nature of these activities, which entail implementation by Member States of policies
relating to public policy and consumer protection." Id.
50 A DICTIONARY OF THE EUROPEAN UNION, supra note 14, at 225 (defining harmonization
and noting its similarity to approximation).
5' CATHERINE BARNARD, THE SUBSTANTIVE LAW OF THE EU: THE FOUR FREEDOMS 493
(2004) (observing that regulatory competition within the market has failed, and that failure
"together with the derogations provided by the [Rome] Treaty and the mandatory requirements
developed by the Court [of Justice], has meant that there would always be a need for
harmonization legislation enacted by the Community institutions to help the market function
properly while at the same time protecting vital public interests such as consumer protection and
public health").
52 Id. at 494.
13 A DICTIONARY OF THE EUROPEAN UNION, supra note 14, at 13. See also id. at 12 (defining
approximation as "a term used to describe the process of removing undesired or unwarranted
differences in national legislation within the context of the internal market").
14 BARNARD, supra note 51, at 494. See also A DICTIONARY OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,
supra note 14, at 239-40 (noting how "[t]he Council accepted the principle of establishing a
single market within a specified deadline.. . [detailing a] programme according to which the
internal market would be completed by December 1992 ... , [and how] [t]he Treaty of
Amsterdam also introduced measures to improve freedom of movement within the EU").
[Vol. 36:413
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Harmonization involves instituting a single EU-wide rule that replaces the
conflicting rules of various Member States.55 This single rule is "intended to
protect certain beneficial interests ... (e.g. consumer protection and public
health), while at the same time advancing free trade and market integration."56
The EU has used various types of harmonization in its attempt to accomplish
this goal: exhaustive, optional, and minimum. 7 The EU has also used mutual
recognition in situations where it feels no harmonization is needed.58
Mutual recognition is the principle that describes "when a product [or
service] is legally manufactured ... in one Member State, it may be freely
offered for sale in other Member States, irrespective of whether it complies
with the relevant national legislation in that country."5 9 Therefore, national
legislation cannot prohibit the introduction of a similar good made with
equivalent standards from being introduced in the host Member State. Thus,
if a Member State provides an equivalent online gambling service, then
theoretically it should be allowed in the host Member state where it is being
offered. However, mutual recognition is rarely used, and is often limited by
the principle of functional equivalence, which "requires those making an
assessment of equivalence to take account not only of the foreign standards but
also of the broader context in which the goods/services are to be used."6
Given this practical limitation, it is unlikely the Court would apply mutual
recognition to gambling services applied across Member States.
Exhaustive harmonization occurs when the national laws across all the EU
Member States are replaced with one EU rule, and Member States cannot do
" BARNARD, supra note 51, at 506.
56 Id.
17 Id. at 507.
58 Id.
59 A DICTIONARY OF THE EUROPEAN UNION, supra note 14, at 280 (noting also that the ECJ
established mutual recognition in Case 120/78, Cassis De Dijon, 1979 E.C.R. 649).
60 BARNARD, supra note 51, at 508.
This can be seen in Commission v. France (Woodworking) [Case 188/84,
1986 E.C.R. 419] concerning woodworking machines manufactured in
Germany according to standards which took account of the fact that those
(Germans) operating them would have a high level of training. However, in
France, standards were premised on the fact that (French) users of the
machines had to be protected from their own mistakes and so presupposed a
low ... level of training. Given these differences between the systems, the
Court allowed France to apply its own standards to the imported German
goods.
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anything to combat it.6 With exhaustive harmonization, the EU will issue a
directive, a piece of EU legislation that is binding upon all members.62
Exhaustive harmonization imposes two obligations on Member States: "to
permit the goods complying with the directive to be freely imported and
marketed (the free movement clause); and to prohibit the sale of goods not
complying with the directive . . . (the exclusivity clause)."63  While
harmonization usually applies to goods, it is equally applicable to the services
context, for the impetus and goal behind the creation of a single, common
market requires the free flow of both goods and services. However, exhaustive
harmonization is difficult to implement as Member States are reluctant to
surrender their power because it weakens their ability to control their national
interest,' especially considering the lasting impact exhaustive harmonization
has on them.
Optional harmonization allows producers the choice of whether to follow
an issued directive.65 In the case of optional harmonization, the producer is
free to disregard the harmonized standard if he sells or provides goods within
a localized area within a country and follows the national standard; however,
if the producer chooses to provide goods across national boundaries, he must
subscribe to the harmonized standard.66 The advantage to optional
harmonization is that it does not disturb the current market conditions in the
various Member States, as they do not have to adapt to changes if sellers are
simply selling in a local area.67
Another advantage is that optional harmonization allows for technological
progress. Unlike exhaustive harmonization, it does not lock Member States
into a required standard, and allows Member States to develop new
61 Id.
62 A DICTIONARY OF THE EUROPEAN UNION, supra note 14, at 111.
[Normally, directives] take the form of general instructions on the goal to be
achieved, while leaving the way in which it will be attained to the discretion
of each Member State. The conditions of a directive are normally met by the
Member States introducing national legislation in conformity with European
Communities stipulations.
Id.
63 BARNARD, supra note 51, at 508-09.
Id. at 510. Thus, exhaustive harmonization actions take years to implement and Member
States may block legislation where the measure may require a unanimous vote in the European
Council. Id.





technologies by not worrying about whether it must comply with an EU
directive.6" Despite the advantages of optional harmonization, the EU has been
reluctant to use this approach, as optional harmonization creates conflicts over
the trade of goods complying with local standards but not with the EU-wide
directive.69
Minimum harmonization occurs when the European Community adopts a
minimum standard to which all Member States must subscribe. The individual
Member States, however, are free to impose stricter standards on goods that
will be either produced within the country or imported into the country.7" The
EU allows this provided the individual Member States higher standards do not
discriminate based on nationality or place of establishment.7 For example,
France may impose a higher standard (on domestic sugar production methods)
than the minimum standard imposed by the EC as long as it applies the same
standard to both French and non-French manufacturers. However, if France
imposes a higher standard for sugar imported from other Member States than
domestically produced sugar this would be a violation, as it would be
discriminating against non-French manufacturers, which is expressly forbidden
under both EU legislation and common law.72
III. ANALYSIS
A. Free Movement of Services
By restricting access to online gambling services, EU Member States are
pursuing policies inconsistent with the Rome Treaty and thus the EU.
Articles 49 and 50 of the Rome Treaty deal with the freedom to provide and
receive services across Member States. Specifically, Article 49 provides that
restrictions cannot be based on nationality or where the specific service is
established.73 More importantly, for the present discussion, the court has held
that Articles 49 and 50 "apply where neither the provider nor the recipient of
the service travels but the service itself moves (e.g., by telephone, fax, email,




71 See id. at 517.
72 See id. at 517-18.
7' EEC Treaty, supra note 22, art. 49.
74 BARNARD, supra note 51, at 333 (citing Case C-384/93, Alpine Investments BVv. Minister
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applicable to betting services provided over the internet.75  Thus, online
gambling specifically falls under Article 49 and 50, and therefore Member
States cannot discriminate against providers of these services based solely on
the providers' national origin.
1. German Example
While the ECJ has yet to rule on recent acts of some EU Member States,76
it seems that Member States are violating Article 49. For example, in March
of 2006, Germany's Federal Constitutional Court "ruled that a state monopoly
on sport betting is acceptable-provided that its objective is to limit
addiction." 7
However, while Germany could reasonably be seen as pursuing the public
policy of curbing gambling addiction by only having state-sponsored betting
establishments, Germany is also allowing private German operated businesses
to operate within the country while excluding non-German businesses.78 This
is directly contrary to Article 49, as Germany is preventing the flow of non-
German gambling services into Germany, which it may only do if the
prohibition is not based on nationality.79 Germany is discriminating against
service providers based on nationality and place of establishment, as the other
potential providers are not located within Germany. Thus, Germany is giving
its own businesses a distinct, illegal advantage over its foreign competitors,
which Article 49, and the court's interpretation of Article 49 in Gambelli,
expressly forbids.8"
However, in line with Gambelli, the EU has allowed the highest court in
Germany to decide the legality of Germany's actions, which the German court
vanfinancien, 1995 E.C.R. I-1 141, where the Court ruled that "Article 49 covered services which
the provider offered by telephone to potential recipients established in other Member States
without moving from the Member State in which the service provider was established").
" Case C-243/0 1, Criminal Proceedings Against Gambelli, 2003 E.C.R. 1- 13031; see also
BARiNARD, supra note 51, at 347-50 (discussing anti-discrimination treatment in the EEC
Treaty).
76 Gambelli, 2003 E.C.R. 1-13031; The Danish Pools, supra note 17 (noting how "the
Commission is building cases against eight countries in addition to the seven countries which
were warned in the spring [of 2006]").
77 Gambling in Europe, supra note 1.
78 Id.




has upheld as consistent both with Gambelli and Article 49." The German
court ruling is purely nationalistic and inconsistent with both Gambelli and
Article 49. Therefore, Germany's courts have affirmed Germany's violation
of Article 49 of the EEC Treaty by allowing this situation to continue.
2. French Example
France has a protectionist policy similar to Germany's. In 2005, it set up
barriers to foreign acquisitions in gambling within France, preferring instead
to have only French owned gambling providers operating within the country.82
Also, a recent French Court of Appeals decision endorsed a foreign ban on
gambling by upholding a ban on Zeturf, a racing bet company operating out of
Malta, that was in direct competition with the government monopoly Pari
Mutuel Urbain.83 The state run racing betting operation may fall under the
public policy exception, although whether the operation was set up to curb
gambling addiction or bring more money to the government remains unclear.84
The ban on foreign companies moving into France to set up gambling
operations, which includes a ban on online operators, violates Article 49 as it
favors French businesses and discriminates against non-French operators
solely on the basis of national origin. 5 Like the courts in Germany, French
courts have found no violation of either EU or common law by France's
actions.86 It appears French courts are using the EU policy of subsidiarity to
favor French business over non-French business.
3. Italian Example
Perhaps the greatest abuse of Article 49 arose in Italy shortly after the
Gambelli decision when the Italian government passed the Finance Act 2006,
which "brought into force laws that require telecommunications and Internet
service providers to block content from operators not licensed in the
country."" This Act effectively blocked access to 684 betting websites not
licensed by Italy as they were either non-Italian run operations within Italy or
8' See Gambling in Europe, supra note 1.
82 Rutherford, supra note 5.
83 Id.
14 Gambelli, 2003 E.C.R. 1-13031.
85 Id.
86 Rutherford, supra note 5.
87 T,4
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were non-Italian operations established outside of Italy.88 This Act violates
Article 49 on two grounds. First, it prevents the free flow of services by those
operations not established within Italy.89 Second, it discriminates against
businesses operating within Italy based on their nationality, since non-Italian
businesses cannot obtain the now required Italian license. 90
4. Conclusion on Services
Germany, France, and Italy are only a few of the many EU Member States
with nationalistic protectionist policies regarding gambling services. The EU
has subscribed to the theory of subsidiarity by allowing individual Member
States to deal with the issue as they see fit, however, this policy is not working
and a change in policy is needed. Member states cannot successfully make an
argument based on the Gambelli public policy exception, since the
governments sponsor gambling themselves and license it to national
organizations within their countries, while discriminating against foreign
organizations solely based on national origin, which Article 49 expressly
prohibits.9 Thus, in order to provide the free flow of services, one of the core
freedoms of the EEC Treaty and an integral part of the EU's internal market,
the EU can no longer rely upon the principle of subsidiarity and must
harmonize policy across its Member States.
B. The Right of Establishment
EU Member states also violate Article 43's right of establishment by
discriminating against foreign companies. Article 43 provides for two types of
establishment for companies: (1) the right to set up and manage undertakings,
in particular companies or firms within the meaning of the second paragraph
of Article 48;92 and, (2) the right to set up agencies, branches, or subsidiaries
by nationals of any Member State established in the territory of any Member
State.93 For example, Italy's license requirement violates Article 43 by
88 Gambling in Europe, supra note 1.
9 Rutherford, supra note 5.
9 Id.
9' Case C-243/01, Criminal Proceeding Against Gambelli, 2003 E.C.R. 1-13031.
92 "Companies or firms" means companies or firms constituted under civil or commercial
law. EEC Treaty, supra note 22, art. 48.
93 Id. art. 43 (emphasis added).
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impeding foreign operations from operating in Italy.94 The Italian law that
favors Italian owned gambling operations over foreign operations both inside
and outside Italy violates Article 43.
Similarly, Article 43 provides that a Member State may not require a
company to set up its primary/registered office or operation in the Member
State in order to operate within the country.9" The European Commission in
Commission v. Italy, argued that an Italian law that required businesses to set
up their primary establishment in Italy in order to conduct business violated
Article 43.96 While Italy argued this law was needed to supervise the
operations of businesses within its borders, the Commission successfully
countered by arguing the requirement of a primary establishment operating
within Italy prevented businesses from establishing other forms of business
branches and agencies, as it prohibited foreign operations from establishing
branches or agencies within Italy to provide their services.97 This type of
national discrimination can be seen in nations across the European Union,
which is one reason why the EU needs to step in.
Because EU Member States are violating the right to the free flow of
services guaranteed in Article 49 and the right to establishment guaranteed in
Article 43, and the highest courts in the individual Member States are allowing
this to occur, the EU can no longer rely upon the principle of subsidiarity in
order to bring Member States into accord with these provisions of EU law and
policy. Therefore, the EU must harmonize policy across its Member States.
The only questions that remain are what type of harmonization is appropriate
and whether any type of harmonization will actually work.
94 BARNARD, supra note 51, at 325 (noting that the ECJ in Case C-272/9 1, Comm 'n of the
Eur. Cmtys. v. Italy, 1994 E.C.R. 1-1409, "said that an Italian law providing that only companies
in which all or a majority of shares were directly or indirectly in public or State ownership could
conclude agreements for data-processing systems for public authorities 'essentially favour[ed]
Italian companies' and so breached Article 43").
9' EEC Treaty, supra note 22, art. 43.
9 Italy, 1996 E.C.R. 1-2691; see also BARNARD, supra note 51, at 312 ("In order to set up
as a securities dealer in Italy, Italian law required that the dealer had to be constituted in the form
of a limited company with its registered office in Italy.").
97 Italy, 1996 E.C.R. 1-2691, 8 (noting that Commission recognized that Article 43 left it
up to the business what type ofestablishment-primary, main office, or secondary-branches and
agencies-it wished to set up within a Member State).
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C. Harmonization
1. Introduction
Article 95 of the EEC Treaty allows for harmonization across the EU in
order to create a single, unified common market among the various Member
States consistent with the goals of the EU.9 8 Considering the previous analysis,
as well as the ECJ's observation that once harmonization becomes an issue
then it "necessarily presuppose[s] Community-wide action,"99 the EU has
various forms of harmonization it may use: exhaustive, optional, minimum,
and mutual recognition. Whether any of these options are practical and
workable will be the focus of this part of the analysis.
2. Exhaustive Harmonization
Exhaustive harmonization occurs when the national laws across all the EU
Member States are replaced with one EU rule that leaves no room for Member
States to combat it.' The exhaustive harmonization approach has until now
only been used in the field of goods; however, it is easily adaptable to the field
of services, as the goal of the EU is to create a single common market in goods
and services.'' This harmonization imposes two obligations on all Member
States: (1) "to permit the goods [or services] complying with the directive to
be freely imported and marketed (the free movement clause); and (2) to
prohibit the sale of goods [or services] not complying with the directive.' ' 2
Applying the concept of exhaustive harmonization to online gambling services,
the EC could adopt a measure requiring a certain regulatory standard to be
imposed upon all Member States, and once imposed, individual Member States
could not impose a stricter standard as their action in the field would be
preempted. Therefore, for the initial exhaustive harmonization measure to
pass, individual Member States must cede power or control in a particular area
to the EU.
" EEC Treaty, supra note 22, art. 95; A DICTIONARY OF THE EUROPEAN UNION, supra note
14, at 13.
9' BARNARD, supra note 51, at 503 (citing Case C-84/94, UK v. Council, 1996 E.C.R. I-
5755).
100 Id. at 508.
101 EEC Treaty, supra note 22, arts. 23 & 49.
102 BARNARD, supra note 51, at 508-09.
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For this reason, previous attempts at exhaustive harmonization have taken
many years to negotiate.'0° Member States want to protect their national
interest, because once the directive is in place the Member State will not be
able to act against it."° Here, many EU Member States have state sponsored
monopolies on online gambling (and gambling in general) the status would be
adamant in protecting these services as they present a great source of revenue
for the country, which they would stand to lose if an unfavorable EU-wide
directive was instituted.
a. Swedish Example
Sweden is a prime example of a Member State incentivized to protect state-
sponsored gambling. Sweden may suffer a great loss of revenue if the EC
issues a directive calling for exhaustive harmonization. The Lotteries Act
(1994) and The Casinos Act (1999) govern all gambling within Sweden and
effectively give all control, along with the The Gaming Board of Sweden, to
the Swedish government. 5 The Lotteries Act makes it a crime to promote
gambling services within Sweden that are not sponsored by the Swedish
government."16
This law directly violates the holding of Gambelli, as well as Article 43, as
businesses cannot establish gambling establishments or provide online
gambling services within Sweden, since they would have to promote them.0 7
It also violates Article 49, as it prevents businesses outside of Sweden from
promoting their online services available from within another Member State.
0 8
However, believing its restriction on private operators are within EU law,
Sweden points to its state interest in "maintaining public order and preventing
crime and addiction."'0 9  In 2002, the Swedish government allowed
SvenskaSpel, the state run gambling operation, to promote its services through
digital media, and in November 2005 allowed SvenskaSpel to provide online
poker to Swedish residents.1 0
'03 Id. at 510.
104 Id. at 509.
"05 Niall A. O'Connor, Swedish Gambling Industry-Questions to be Answered, BETTING
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In light of Gambelli, Sweden's restrictions on private gambling can only be
justified if they are made in an attempt to lower or reduce gambling
opportunities for Swedish residents and to prevent addiction.l," However, this
is clearly not the case as SvenskaSpel' s 2003 annual report on gambling within
Sweden showed gambling "increased by 3.5%, not least due to energetic
marketing" by SvenskaSpel.1 2 While SevenskaSpel did not actively begin to
promote its internet gambling until 2003, shortly after this time visitors to the
site "tripled to about 600,000 a month and more than 100,000 new gaming
accounts were registered in a very short time.'1 13
These actions do not fall within Gambelli's exceptions as Sweden is not
prohibiting foreign online gambling services in order to curb gambling within
Sweden."1 4 Sweden is prohibiting online gambling through foreign, non-
Swedish sponsored operations in order to extract all the revenue from the
operation for itself.1 5 This also violates Article 49 as Sweden is preventing
the free flow of services without a legitimate excuse.
If the EC issued a directive calling for harmonization that would allow the
free flow of online gambling services across Member States, then Sweden
would stand to lose a great deal of revenue.'1 6 Thus, they, along with other
Member States who have similar operations within their respective Member
States, would adamantly oppose it.
b. Would Exhaustive Harmonization Work?
While exhaustive harmonization would be the best option to achieve a level
playing field for online gambling services across EU Member States, it is
impractical and unworkable. First, states would adamantly oppose it in order
to protect their own national monopoly. Second, if it was to pass, which is
especially unlikely if the Council requires a unanimous vote, it would prove
. Case C-243/0 1, Criminal Proceedings Against Gambelli, 2003 E.C.R. 1- 13031. See also
O'Connor, supra note 105 (noting how Swedish courts have not applied the Gambelli decision
to operations within Sweden).
112 O'Connor, supra note 105.
113 Id.
114 Id.
... Id.; O'Connor, supra note 42 ("In June 2005, the Swedish Supreme Administrative Court
decided not to overturn the Swedish government's decision to reject an application from
Ladbrokes to be allowed to set up betting operations in Sweden.").




too inflexible to deal with the evolving nature of online gambling. Exhaustive
harmonization by its definition allows no flexibility within Member States to
adapt and mold the measure as they see fit." 7 Therefore, while it would
certainly be the best option to create a free flow of online gambling services
across the EU, exhaustive harmonization is not practical and thus could not be
effectively implemented.
3. Optional Harmonization
Optional harmonization occurs when the issued directive gives a
harmonized standard which providers of goods or services can then choose to
follow."' The producer is free to not follow the harmonized standard if he
sells or provides goods or services within a localized area of a country and
instead follows the national standard." 9 However, if the producer chooses to
provide services across national boundaries then he must subscribe to the EU
harmonized standard.'2 It is possible this approach would work as it would
still allow a producer of a service, here online gambling, to provide it solely
within a Member State and therefore not have to comply with EU standards.
However, the problem is the exclusion of online services from various Member
States. Optional harmonization appears to regulate online gambling service
providers in Member State A that want to provide services in Member State B
by forcing compliance with EU standards. This would create a free flow of
services across Member States.
Determining what the EU standard will be is a remaining problem, as
Member States would desire a stringent standard to protect their monopoly on
online gambling. A very lax standard would allow anyone to provide online
gambling services within the Member State and affect the revenue they would
receive from their own gambling provider.'2 ' Also, if the standard was too
strict and deterred providing services across borders, it would be no different
from the current situation. Local online gambling service providers would
continue operating solely within the borders of one Member State, which is not
the goal of harmonization.
"7 See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
Is BARNARD, supra note 51, at 515.
119 Id.
120 Id.
121 See generally Rutherford, supra note 5; Gambling in Europe, supra note 1; Verbiest &
Keuleers, supra note 21.
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In order to keep the status quo within the Member States, many nations
would lobby for a strict standard making compliance difficult for private
online gambling providers. Member States could continue to operate their
local online gambling operations solely within the borders of their country
while ignoring the EU directive and competition from foreign competitors who
would not be able to comply with the strict standard.
Optional harmonization would in essence face similar problems to those
presented by exhaustive harmonization. Member States would be reluctant to
cede authority and have their state-run revenue generator damaged by the
influx of various private online gambling providers. Given this reluctance to
cede authority, Member States would advocate for a stringent standard thereby
reducing the likelihood of acceptance by the Council. Therefore, while it
appears in theory a practical and a viable option, in reality, optional
harmonization will not work and would only maintain the status quo under EU
law instead of individual state law.
4. Minimum Harmonization
Minimum harmonization occurs when the European Community adopts a
minimum standard to which all Member States must subscribe, while also
allowing individual Member States to impose higher standards on goods that
will be either produced within the country or imported into the country. 2
Provided the individual Member State's higher standards do not discriminate
based on nationality or place of establishment, the EU allows the
implementation of higher standards.'23
Of all the harmonization approaches available, this option seems to be the
most viable and practical to achieve a single unified market for online
gambling services across the European Union. Minimum harmonization
provides the baseline to which all Member States must subscribe, but is also
flexible by allowing for more stringent standards within each Member State
based upon the national interests that any individual Member State may
have. '24
.2 BARNARD, supra note 51, at 515.
..3 Id. at 517-18.




For example, in a Member State that does not provide gambling services as
part of a national monopoly, minimum harmonization would allow that country
to set a higher standard on services within the country, as that country has
already made known its position and national interest by not promoting
gambling within its borders.'25 However, in a country, like Sweden, that has
a rampant state run gambling operation, the EC harmonization effort would
likely not allow a higher standard to be imposed, as the "[t]reaty provisions...
set the ceiling which national legislation cannot exceed."' 26 The EC directive
would set a ceiling that would not allow a Member State to impose a complete
ban of online gambling services from other states. 27 An online gambling
service would have to meet the minimum standards imposed on it by the EC
Directive if it wanted to pursue business in other Member States.
For example, in Buet v. Ministre Public, the ECJ found that a French law
prohibiting door-to-door sales of goods was acceptable within the framework
of an EC directive although the EC directive did not call for a complete ban on
door-to-door sales. 28 The ECJ found that Article 8 of the EEC Treaty allowed
Member States to impose a stricter standard in order to protect consumers
which might include prohibition of these contracts entered into away from
business premises.'29
This rationale has been expanded to the area of services in the De Agostini
cases. 30 The ECJ concluded a Member State may not interfere with a
broadcaster's freedom to provide transmissions to other Member States. The
ECJ recognized Directive 89/552, also known as the Television Without
Frontiers Directive, which was enacted to assure the freedom of broadcasters
to provide television services."' The basic principle behind the directive is
that responsibility is on the transmitting state to ensure that broadcasters
comply with both the directive and the potentially stricter national standards
25 See generally id.
126 Id. at 516 & n.183.
127 Id. at 516.
121 Case C382/87, Buet v. Minist&e Public, 1989 E.C.R. 1235.
129 BARNARD, supra note 51, at 517.
130 Joined Cases C-34-36/95, De Agostini, 1997 E.C.R. 1-3843.
131 Council Directive 89/552, 1989 O.J. (L298) 23, amended by Council Directive 97/36,
art. 2(1), 1997 O.J. (L202) 60 (EC) ("Each Member State shall ensure that all television
broadcasts transmitted by broadcasters under its jurisdiction comply with the rules of the system
of law applicable to broadcasts intended for the public in that Member State.").
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imposed within the host state.'3 2 The corollary to this rule is that receiving
states must accept the broadcasts from transmitting states without exception,
provided the broadcast complies with the EU-wide Directive. 133
However, compliance with the directive does not completely immunize
broadcasts. Article 2(2)(a) provides that the receiving state can refuse to
accept transmissions from a transmitting Member State if the program
"manifestly, seriously, and gravely" impairs the physical, mental, or moral
development of minors. 1
34
The rationale behind the harmonization of television broadcasting is equally
applicable in the context of online gambling services because both are services
transmitted from one Member State to another. Therefore, it appears that the
EU could institute a directive, as it has already done with television
broadcasting, that would set a baseline for the minimum criteria an online
gambling company would need to meet in order to provide services both within
Member States and between Member States. Individual Member States could
then set higher standards for operations within its borders.
However, Member States could not ban online gambling "transmissions"
from other Member States provided those transmissions complied with the
criteria established by the EU. Like the television context, this option appears
to be viable for achieving an EU-wide policy on online gambling among
Member States.
b. Need for a High Baseline
The baseline criteria would have to be relatively high in order to create
consistency across the EU. If Member States imposed higher criteria for
businesses operating within their borders, it would create a migration of online
gambling providers to countries subscribing only to the baseline criteria
imposed by the EU.'35 Therefore, a Member State would initially want a
132 Id.
133 Id.
134 Id. art. 2(2)(a).
135 Extent of Online Gambling, supra note 11. British Secretary of State for Culture, Media
and Sport, Tessa Jowell, stated
research shows that online gambling is on the rise and there is a need to do
something about this at a global level, as well as in the UK. I want to secure
international support for agreed standards of regulation. That's why I called
the summit today... Of course we also want online gambling companies to
come onshore. We will welcome them here because we believe that by
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business to meet high standards before it offered services across the EU. It is
unlikely that individual Member States would want to impose higher standards
only to have the business leave for a Member State that subscribes to the lower
EU baseline, thereby resulting in lost tax revenue. It appears minimum
harmonization faces the same initial problem as the other forms of
harmonization: since each Member State looks out for its own interest, how
will the initial directive be passed?
5. Mutual Recognition
Mutual recognition is the principle that "when a product [or service] is
legally manufactured in one Member State, it may be freely offered for sale in
other Member States, irrespective of whether it complies with the relevant
national legislation in that country."' 36 Specifically, national legislation cannot
prohibit the introduction of a similar foreign good made with standard
equivalent to that enforced in the host Member State. 137 Thus, if a Member
State provides an equivalent online gambling service, then theoretically it
should be allowed in the host Member State where it is being offered.
Mutual recognition perhaps offers an answer to the problem of how to get
Member States to agree to an EU-wide harmonization of gambling services.
If Member States must recognize equivalent gambling services from other
Member States, then Member States would be able to provide online gambling
services in other Member States.
For example, Sweden would be able to provide its state-run online
gambling business in other Member States, but it would also have to allow
non-Swedish sponsored online gambling businesses to provide their services
within Sweden. Sweden would be able to retain its tax revenue from the
operation while it expanded its operation into other Member States at the same
time.
allowing those who want to gamble to do so over the counter, not under the
counter is the best way to protect children and vulnerable people and keep out
crime... But we won't take part in a regulatory race to the bottom. On the
contrary, if companies do come to the UK it will be because "regulated in the
Great Britain" will mean a website is subject to the most stringent controls
and social responsibility requirements anywhere in the world.
Id.
136 A DICTIONARY OF THE EUROPEAN UNION, supra note 14, at 280 (noting also that the ECJ
established mutual recognition in Case 120/78, Cassis De Dijon, 1979 E.C.R. 649).
137 Id.
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Similarly, a private business operating in Germany would be able to
provide its services within France. France would have to allow the business,
but it could also expand its operations into Germany. This would create a
competitive regime where only the best online gambling services would
survive, which presumably would be those that are the safest and securest for
their customers, a measure that would be the baseline for the EU directive.
This would likely be allowed by Member States as they would want the
increased tax revenue that would be generated within their country from these
private or public businesses.
This view seems to be gaining hold in some EU Member States. For
example, Italy, an early supporter of banning online gambling within its
borders, recently loosened its tight restrictions on online gambling.13 8 Italy's
decision to regulate, instead of completely banning online gambling, "has
already brought a boost to the Italian economy .. ,- "39 Italy's decision has also
brought respectable online gambling operations, like Ladbrokes and William
Hill, to the table to apply for Italian licenses, this generating increased revenue
as citizens gamble on these respectable sites. 4 ° Following Italy's lead, Spain
has also announced plans to institute regulated areas where it will allow
gambling, specifically online gambling. 4' Spain, like Italy, will grant licenses
to private businesses valid for a set number of years, if the business meets the
standards imposed by Spain. After expiration the licenses are subject to
renewal.'42 It is evident, when considering the lead of Italy and Spain, that
allowing private businesses to provide online gambling, and to actually set up
operations within Member States, combined with regulation, is a viable
alternative to the current prohibition in many Member States.
IV. CONCLUSION
With the growing emergence of online gambling as a major business
throughout the world, the time has come for the European Union to speak in
a single voice for all its Member States on the issue.'43 Individual Member
38 Haley Hintze, Major Nations Now Debating Online Poker Legislation, POKER NEWS,






113 Extent of Online Gambling, supra note 1 1 (as recognized by the UK in research it
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States have stated their desires to keep online gambling a matter solely within
the discretion of the respective Member State; however, this often means a
prohibition on the importation of online gambling from any other Member
State and a prohibition on the establishment of gambling operations not
licensed by the individual Member State.
With the rise of the internet, nations are faced with the prospect of
attempting to protect their state run source of revenue from private companies
attempting to procure citizens who once willingly wagered with the state run
operations. This is a tough task for these countries, as it is estimated that there
are 2,000 online gambling sites with an estimated 23 million people wagering
nearly $12 billion in 2005 alone. 44 Some countries, notably England, Italy,
and Spain, however, have already recognized the benefit and additional source
of revenue a regulated online gambling regime can bring. These countries are
in the minority, though, as most EU countries continue the prohibition of non-
state sponsored gambling.
Prohibition is contrary to the EU's stated goal in the Treaty of Rome, which
has been amended to provide for a single market across EU Member States in
both goods and services, a category into which online gambling falls. In 1994,
the ECJ, in Her Majesty's Customs and Excise v. Schindler, established that
gambling is a legitimate "service" under the meaning of the Treaty of Rome. '
45
Any attempt to prohibit the importation of online gambling violates the
Article 49 provision for the free flow of services.
However, Member States argue there is no specific EU legislation
prohibiting them from outlawing non-state licenses or sponsored gambling
within their state. Also, these Member States point to cases, like Gambelli,
where the ECJ held that national restrictions can be justified by public interest
objectives. Member States argue consumer protection, as well as a curbing the
problem of gambling within the country, falls into this category. However,
prohibitions on online gambling do not serve any public interest goals and
therefore cannot fall under any Gambelli exception.
It is time for the EU to go beyond cases like Gambelli and to attempt a
harmonization across the EU by allowing country sponsored and private
company online gambling in each of its Member States. Considering the
conducted for the first ever online gambling summit held at the Royal Ascot in Great Britain on
October 31, 2006).
'" Fahrenkopf, supra note 10.
145 Case C-275/92, Her Majesty's Customs and Excise v. Schindler, 1994 E.C.R. 1-1039;
Rutherford, supra note 5.
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borderless nature of online gaming, the harmonization of online gaming across
the EU would establish a framework for national governments to work within,
while at the same time protecting consumers, which many states argue is their
primary goal in restricting cross-border gaming.
Leaving the decision up to the individual Member States has proven
impractical. Member States are attempting to prohibit the free flow of online
gambling, a potentially impossible task. States like England, Italy, and Spain
have already recognized the advantages, to both the state in additional revenue
and to consumers who only do business with reputable online organizations,
in allowing regulated online gambling within their respective countries. 46
The best solution would be two-fold. The EU should institute a minimum
harmonization standard coupled with a mutual recognition strategy. If the
minimum standard is relatively high, protective Member States would be more
likely to sign on and ensure the standard's passage. Also, through the mutual
recognition strategy, Member States would have to allow online gambling
services once the services met the minimum standard or, if in place, the higher
one set by the host Member State.
Member States with online gambling operations already operating within
their borders should not be able to ban the importation of this service on
Gambelli grounds. Because it appears they are already promoting gambling
within their borders, they cannot argue a ban will help curb the immoral
activity of gambling within its borders. Member States that do not have online
gambling operations, either privately or publicly run, within their borders at
the time of the directive, may successfully argue that a ban on importation of
online gambling is allowed under Gambelli.
The wording of the directive should be flexible enough to allow for
changes. For example, if a Member State, that did not have online gambling
within its borders at the time of the directive, later allows online gambling
businesses to operate within its borders, it would then fall under the Minimum
Standard imposed by the EU and would have to allow online gambling services
from other states.
Under this framework, online gambling would be able to freely flow from
one country to another over the unbounded internet, thereby bringing all
Member States into line with the stated goal of creating a single, unified
market for the free flow of goods and services.
Also, an EU-wide Directive would allow for regulation of the online
gambling businesses operating within the EU. This would protect consumers
," Hintze, supra note 138.
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from fraudulent transactions that might occur in an unregulated industry such
as the online gambling industry. Currently, there are over 2,300 sites
operating, the great majority of which are unregulated. 47 This would fulfill
many Member States' stated goal of providing for the protection of their
consumers.
This could also potentially generate more tax revenue from businesses
operating within the EU because they would now be regulated and taxed.
Also, the EU could potentially keep out online gambling provided by operators
outside of the EU. The operations set up within the EU would potentially be
competitive enough to keep the EU consumer euros within the EU.'48
It is only by speaking with a single, unified voice that the EU can bring its
Member States together to further the common goal of attaining a single,
common market across the EU. The EU's approach to the issue will be
interesting as it attempts to address the always evolving issue of the internet,
which will certainly confront the EU with various issues in the coming years.
The EU's decision on online gambling will set the stage for many issues it will
confront in the coming years. It begs the question whether the EU is as unified
as it appears or whether it will be easily divided. Stay tuned, but hopefully the
EU will make the decision most beneficial to the parties involved and which
harmonizes online gambling.
117 Extent of Online Gambling, supra note 11.
148 Id.
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